CURRENT DECISIONS by unknown
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DuE PROCESS-FoRFEITURE-DRAFT ANIMAL AND
HARNESS PART OF "CONVEYANCE."--A proceeding was begun for the seizure
and condemnation of a buggy together with the draft animal and harness hitched
thereto under a statute which provided for the condemnation of "all vehicles
and conveyances of every kind and description which are used . . . in
conveying any liquors." It was urged that the mule with the harness hitched
ta and -bing used to draw the buggy in which liquors were being conveyed
in violation of the statute did not constitute a part of the "conveyance." Held,
that the mule and harness constituted an essential part of the conveyance.
Atkinson, J., dissenting. Gates v. State (i919, Ga.) IOI S. E. 769.
The decision sustaining the constitutionality of this Georgia statute was
annotated in (IgIg) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 824.
CONTRACTS-CONSIDERATION-ILLEGALITY.-The defendant induced the plaintiff
to break his contract with a third party by giving a bond to indemnify the
plaintiff in case he should be compelled to pay damages for the breach. The
plaintiff, having been compelled to pay damages, sued the defendant on the bond.
Held, that he should not recover. Hocking Valley Ry. v. Barbour (i92o, App..
Div.) 179 N. Y. Supp. 81o.
The court held that since the consideration for the contract of indemnity,
breiking the contract with the third party, was illegal, the contract of indemnity
was unenforcible;. that to enforce it would be assisting in the civil wrong done
the third party. This seems sound and in accord with the authorities. Inducing
one to breaka contract operates to create a right to damages in the injured third
party against the enticer. See COMMENT (1916) 25 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 407.
And where the consideration is the commission of a civil wrong the contract is
usually unenforcible. Randall v. Howard (1862, U. S.) 2 Black; 585; Stewart
v. Scott (i891) 54 Ark. 187, 15 S. W. 463.
CONTRACTS-INTERPRETATION-DUTY AND LIABILITY OF PUBLIC SERvlcE COMPAN-
IEs.-The appellant company entered into a contract with the respondent city by
which inter alia the former secured a privilege to operate its cars over certain
streets together with a duty "to keep in good repair the roadway between. the rails
... with the same material as the city shall have last used to pave or repave these
spaces and the street previous to such repairs." .At the time this contract was
made, the entire street was paved with macadam. Fifteen years later the city
repaved all the street except this railway zone with asphalt upon a concrete
foundation and ordered, by ordinance, the company to repave its zone with like
material. Upon refusal the city secured a peremptory writ of mandamus. The
company claimed that its contractual duty was only to repave with the same
material as the city last used between the rails; that the city was attempting to
impose an inherently arbitrary and unreasonable non-contractual duty; and
that performance of the duty contemplated by the city would reduce its income
below a reasonable return on the investment and thus deprive it of its property
in violation of the Fourteenth, Amendment. Held, that the duty to repave
created by the contract, as construed by the city, must be fulfilled. Pitney and
McReynolds, JJ., dissenting. Milwaukee Electric Railway and Light Co. v.
Slate of Wisconsin ex rel. City of Milwaukee (March I, i92o) U. S. Sup. Ct.
Oct. Term, I919, No. 55.
The Court based its decision solely on the contract and termed the company's
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construction "not reasonable." It professed not to consider whether the city
possessed, as contended, a power, created by statute, to make "reasonable rules
and regulations," the company being under the correlative statutory liability of
being placed under a duty by the exercise of the power. It was further held
that the contract duty was not extinguished by the financial condition of the
company although this fact should be considered in determining the existence
in a particular-case of a common-law or statutory power to direct an unre-
munerative extension of facilities or to forbid their abandonment, i. e., whether
the company was under a correlative liability to have, such a duty imposed upon
it. See (1913) 23 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 51-52. In reference to the power to
change rates fixed by contract see Professor Burdick, Regulating Franchise
Rates (1920) 29 ibid., 589.
CONTRACTS-OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE-FAILURE OF OFFEREE's AGENT TO TRANS-
MIT OFFER TO PRINCIPAL AS A TORT.-One Joplin, agent of defendant, in October,
1916, solicited and obtained from the plaintiff an order "taken subject to accept-
ance" of the defendant for 3 bales of duck to be shipped August r, 1917. Joplin
failed to transmit the order to the defendant who first learned of it when the
plaintiff wrote in July, 1917, asking that shipment be made during the following
month. Upon the defendant's refusal to ship, the plaintiff sued, setting up first
a cause of action for breach of.a contract and second that relying upon his belief
that the contract had been accepted he had failed to buy duck until the market
price had greatly advanced and that the defendant by reason of the negligence
of its agent in failing to transmit the offer was estopped to deny the existence
of a contract. The jury found for the -plaintiff and judgment was entered on
the verdict. Held, that such judgment was error and judgment should be
entered for the defendant. Four States Grocer Co. v. Wickendon (I919, Tex.)
217 S. W. 1103.
See COMMENTS, supra, p. 673.
CONTRACTs-RESTRAINT OF TRAE-EmPLOYEE.-The defendant, in an employ-
ment contract with the plaintiff, agreed that he would not engage in any business
which would compete with the plaintiff for five years after the termination of
his employment. The defendant a month later set up a similar business of
his own and advertised himself as formerly with the plaintiff's store. The
plaintiff sued for an injunction. Held, that the injunction be denied. Samuel
Stores, Inc. v. Abrams (i919, Conn.) 1o8 At. 54i.
The decision seems sound and in accord with the weight of authority. See
(1919) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 232- As to implied conditions against unfair
competition in a contract between a publisher and the owner of a copyright,
2see (I918) 27 ibid., 837.
CONTRACTs-RESTRAINT OF TRADE-USE OF TRADE NAME.-The plaintiffs,
-manufacturers of motion picture films, engaged the defendant, an actor of
almost no .experience, to work for them on contracts from year to year. Each
yearly contract provided that he should act under the name of Stewart Rome
while employed by the plaintiffs, but that he should never use that name when
not acting for them. After three years with the plaintiffs, during which time
he became famous as the actor, Stewart Rome. the defendant, left for war ser-
vice. On his return he was engaged by a rival concern and immediately pro-
ceeded to act under the name of Stewart Rome. The plaintiffs then brought
this action to restrain him from using that name. Held, that an injunction
should not be granted. Hepworth Manufacturing Co., Ltd. v. Wernham Ryott
(i919, H. L.) 122 L. T. Rep. 135.
For a discussion approving the decision of this case in the court of Chancery,
here affirmed, see (I919) 29 YALE, LAW JOURNAL, 232.
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CONTRACTS-THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY-STATUTORY RIGHT OF MATERIALMEN
TO SUE ON CONTRACTOR'S BOND NOT EXTINGUISHED BY AGREEMENT BETWEEN CITY
AND CONTRACToR.-A state statute provided that a city which let a contract for
a public building should require the contractor to execute a bond with sureties
for the payment of all material furnished for the said work and gave those
furnishing material therefor the "right to sue on said bond." The defendant
builder contracted with the defendant city for the erection of a public building
and furnished a bond with sureties to the city which contained a provision that
"no right of action shall accrue by reason hereof, to or for the use or benefit
of any one other than the obligee herein named." The plaintiff sued the city,
contractor and sureties for material furnished, his real purpose being to "hold"
the sureties on the bond. Held, that the plaintiff could recover from the sureties,
as the right he secured under the statute could not be extinguished by the bond
provision which limited the obligor's duty to the city only. Ingold v. City of
Hickory et al. (i919, N. C.) ioi S. E. 525.
For a discussion of the right of a materialman against an obligor on a builders'
bond in the absence of such a statute, see COMMENT (1919) 28 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 798.
CORPORATIONS-STOCKHOLDER'S LIABILITY FOR CORPORATE DEBTS-JUDGMENT AT
LAW AS A CONDITION PRECEDENT-The plaintiff was the sole creditor of a cor-
poration of which the defendant was the sole stockholder. The defendant took
the corporate assets and left the corporation insolvent. This action was brought
in equity, on the debt, without first securing a judgment at law or joining th&
corporation as a party defendant. Held, that the plaintiff should recover.
Louisville & N. R. R. v. Nield (i919, Ky.) 216 . W. 62.
See COMMENTS, supra, p. 659.
EASEMENTS-WAYS OF NECESSITY-REBUTTED BY ORAL CONVERSATION.-A deed
of land was executed and delivered under such circumstances that a way of
necessity would ordinarily have been created over land retained by the grantor.
In litigation involving the existence of this right of way, evidence of an oral
agreement between the parties that no easement should be granted was intro-
duced without objection. Thereafter the alleged dominant owner requested a
ruling that this evidence could not be considered. Held, that the evidence,
having been introduced without objection, was relevant to show the actual
intention of the parties in rebuttal of the presumption of a way of necessity.
Orpnts v. Morrison (1918) 23o Mass. 529, 12o N. E. 183.
See COMMENTS, supra, p. 665.
EQUITY-JURISDICTION-INJUNCTION AGAINST ELECTIoN.-The Secretary of the
State of Illinois, under an act providing for the expression of opinion by
electors on questions of public policy, intended to submit at an election ques-
tions presented by petition of ten per cent. of the voters. The plaintiff, a
citizen and taxpayer of the state, filed a bill for an injunction to restrain the
submission of these questions, alleging that if they should be favored by a
majority of electors, they would constitute instructions to the delegates to the
proposed constitutional convention, and that under the constitution of the state
there was no power to instruct such delegates. Held, that the injunction should
not issue. Payne v. Emerson (1919, Ill.) 125 N. E. 329.
See COMMENTS, supra, p. 655.
EviDENCE-PRESUMPTIONS-SANTY OF TESTATOR-An action was brought to
set aside the probate of a will on the ground that the testator had been of
unsound mind. Held, that the probate should stand, with a dictum that there
was a presumption of sanity- of the testator, consequently the burden of proving
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incapacity was on the contestants. Kerkhoff v. Monkemeier (1920, Iowa) 175
N. W. 762.
A large minority of courts hold with Iowa as to the burden of proving
testamentary incapacity but to treat such a rule as a consequence of the pre-
sumption of sanity seems clearly erroneous.. See COMMENT (1917) 26 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 777; cf. Thomson v. State (igig, Fla.) 83 So. 291. But the rule
itself has strong reason behind it. The presumption is not, on sound theory,
itself evidence of the fact presumed. Wheeler's Appeal (1917) 91 Conn. 388,
ioo Atl. 13, overruling Sturdevant's Appeal (899) 71 Conn. 392, 42 Atl. 70.
The fact on which it is based, that most men who duly execute a will are of
sound mind, has strong probative value. See COMMENT, supra. And the Iowa
rule seems in practice to be the simplest way of giving expression to this fact.
EVIDENcE-WITNESSEs-CHiLD.-The plaintiff when five years old was bitten
by the defendant's dog. A suit for damages was begun and the case came to
trial three years later. The plaintiff, who was a bright child and had due
appreciation of the significance of an oath, was permitted to testify. Held, that
such testimony was properly admitted. Maynard v. Keough (192o, Minn.) 175
N. W. 89I.
The court said that even though the child was perhaps too immature to
testify at the time of the occurrence, she was competent at the time of the trial,
which is the time competency is to be determined; that her intelligence showed
she could remember the incident; and that the distinctness of the witness's
memory goes to the weight of the evidence. This seems sound.
FRAun--LEAsE-REscissioN.-The plaintiff in writing leased certain premises
to the defendant, rent to be paid quarterly. The defendant took possession in
i916 and paid rent until 1918 and then defaulted. The plaintiff sued for the
rent due. The defendant again defaulted on the next payment, and-the plaintiff
brought an action for the rent for that term. The two actions were consolidated,
and the defence was that the plaintiff had induced the defendant to accept-the
lease by fraud. He had not rescinded upon discovery of the fraud, but retained
possession. Held, that the plaintiff should recover. Defiel v. Rosenberg (1919,
Minn.) 174 N..W. 838.
The court correctly stated that the proper remedy of the defendant was
prompt rescission, upon discovery of the fraud, of the unexpired term of the
lease, and an action for damages or proper relief which would restore him as
nearly as possible to his position before accepting the lease. As to re-tender
of consideration in rescission, see supra, CASE NOTES, sub. tit., FRAUD.
INSURANcE-LIFE INSURANcE-AsSIGNMENT OF POLICY TO ONE WITHOUT IN-
SURABLE INTEREST VALi.-The holder of a policy of life insurance "taken out"
in good faith and payable to "his executors, administrators, or assigns" assigned
it for value to one who had no insurable interest in his life. The assignee
notified the company of the assignment and paid the premiums thereafter until
the insured's death. The executor then filed a bill to set aside the assignment.
Held, that the bill be dismissed. Hawley v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (igig, Ill.) 125
N. E. 707.
The court stated: "To sustain the doctrine of counsel for appellant on this
point would be, in effect, to hold that a valid policy cannot be sold in the best
market but must be either surrendered to the company or sold to a person having
an insurable interest, and this would in most cases result in compelling the policy
holder to surrender his policy to the insuring company at its own figure." It is
now generally admitted that one who has insured his own life in good faith has
a power to "assign the policy" to another who has no insurable interest in the
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insured's life and thus create a conditional right in the assignee to the payment
of the insurance money. It must appear that the insurance contract Was made
in good faith and not merely to circumvent the requirement of insurable interest.
For a discussion of the relevant decisions, some of which retarded the crystalliza-
tion of the now well recognized rule, see (igiS) 24 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 433;
(191I) 21 ibid., I68, 422; see also (I918).27 ibid., lO83; and a leading contra
case, Russell v. Grigsby (igog, C. C. A. 6th) 168 Fed. 577, approved (igo9) 23
HARV. L. REv. 65, and repudiated by the Supreme Court in Grigsby v. Russell
(19II) 222 U. S. 149, 32 Sup. Ct. 58, which adopted the view of the principal
-case.
MONOPOLIES-SHERMAN ACT-IMPOSING RESALE PRICES BY CONTRACT WITH
CUSTOMERS UNLAWFUL.-An indictment under the Sherman Act alleged that
the defendant corporation manufactured under letters patent valves and other
accessories which it sold to manufacturers and jobbers in automobile tires under
uniform contracts that they should resell at fixed prices, thereby supjressing
-competition. The lower court sustained a demurrer. Held, that this ruling was
-erroneous. United States v. Schrader's Son, Inc. (March I, 192o) U. S. Sup. Ct.
Oct. Term 1919, No. 567.
In sustaining the demurrer the lower court relied upon a recent Supreme
Court decision. United States v. Colgate & Co. (1919) 250 U. S. 30, 39 Sup.
Ct. 465. It thought this case modified the doctrine of Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.
Park & Sons Co. (1911) 220 U. S. 373, 31 Sup. Ct. 376. The opinion of Mr.
Justice Brandeis repudiates the suggestion that there is no inconsistency between
the two cases, and reaffirms the distinction, taken in the Colgate case, between
exercising one's privilege of refusing to sell to customers who are unwilling to
maintain resale prices and attempting by contract to obtain a right that one's
customers shall maintain such prices. The former is lawful; the latter forbidden
by the Sherman Act. See (I919) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 505; (1920) 29
ibid., 365. And see Brown, The Right to Refuse to Sell (1916) 25 ibid., 194.
PROPERTY-PROFITS A PRENDRE-PRIVILEGE OF TAKING AND SELLING SPRING
WATER.-In igog the New York legislature created a board of commissioners
of the state reservation at Saratoga Springs empowering it to grant concessions
and leases of any portion of the same upon terms to be fixed by it. Thereafter
this board executed an instrument in writing with four individuals, granting
them for a period, which with renewals would total twenty-five years, the
privilege of bottling and selling the water from the Saratoga Springs under
-certain conditions and preserving to the public free access to the reservation
and free use of the waters there for drinking or bathing. The plaintiff cor-
poration was organized to take the place of the four individuals named. There-
after the legislature transferred the powers of the board to the conservation
commission which prevented plaintiff froi exercising the privileges granted.
He sued for an injunction and damages. Held, the plaintiff should have the
relief sought. Crane, J., dissenting. Saratoga State Waters Corporation v.
Pratt (192o, N. Y.) 125 N. E. 834.
The decision, which involves a holding that the privilege granted of taking
and selling spring water was a profit a prendre, seems unquestionable. See
COMMENT (1919) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 218. So also does the holding that
the defendant is nof protected by a later act of the legislature and is to be
treated as a private wrongdQer. The court below had held that injunction
would not lie against a state officer acting pursuant to a statute. (1918) 184
-App. Div. 561, 172 N. Y. Supp. 4o . The writer of the opinion, however, attempts
definitions of various terms, such as easements and profits, which are so lack-
ing in careful analysis that they may well involve trouble for the court here-
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after. The court also suggests that easements in gross are in many places held
unassignable, indicating a lack of acquaintance with the New York authorities
similar to that of the Appfellate Division in Matthews Slate Co. v. Advance
Industrial Supply Co. (I918) x85 App. Div. 74, 172 N. Y. Supl. 830; (1919)
29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 218, 219.
SALES-WARRANTY-RUNNING WITH PERSONALTY.-The defendant traded a
stallion to the plaintiff, representing that it was sound. The plaintiff traded
it to W, making a similar representation. The stallion was in fact wind broken
and W sued the plaintiff who notified the defendant to appear, which he failed
to do. The plaintiff sued the defendant for the amount of the judgment which
he paid W. The jury found that the stallion was sound when delivered by the
defendant to the plaintiff. Held, that the plaintiff should not recover. Booth
v. Scheer (igg, Kan.) 185 Pac.'898.
The finding of the jury rendered unnecessary the long discussion whether
a warranty "runs with personalty." The accepted rule is that it does not.
Smith v. Williams (I9O3) 117 Ga. 782, 45 S. E. 394. Except where there is an
assignment of the right against the warrantor. Cf. Bordwell v. Collie (1871)
45 N. Y. 494; see Williston, Sales (igo9) sec. 244. Or by trade custom, as in
the case of a tobacco sampler's warranty. Conestoga Cigar Co. v. Finke (I89I)
144 Pa. 159, 22 Atl. 868. Other seeming exceptions really "sound in tort."
See COMMENT (I918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, io68.
TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES-REGULATION MAKING COMPANY'S MESSENGER
AGENT OF SENDER REASONABLE.-The plaintiff sued to recover damages caused by
the defendant's failure to transmit and deliver a telegram addressed to him
by A. The message was given by the sender to a messenger but was never
delivered at the defendant's transmitting office. The company pleaded in defence
the stipulation on the telegraph blank, a part of the contract, that "no responsi-
bility attaches to this company concerning telegrams until same are accepted at
one of its transmitting offices, and if the telegram is sent to such office by one
of the company's messengers, he acts for that purpose as agent of the sender."
Held, that recovery must be denied, the provision being reasonable and hence
binding. Collotta v. Western Union (1920, Miss.) 83 So. 4Ol.
The court followed the few cases which have decided this precise question.
Ayres v. Western Union (i9oi) 65 App. Div. 149, 72 N. Y. Supp. 634; Stanley
v. Western Union (1894) 92 Ga. 613, 18 S. E. ioo8. For the effect of the
company's limitation as to the amount of damages it will be under a duty to;pay
in case of nondelivery or error in an unrepeated message, see (1920) 29 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 573.
T RTS-NEGLIGENcE-LAST CLEAR CHANE.-The decedent, a "licensee," while
walking on the tracks of the defendant railroad, was struck and killed by a
train. The engineer gave no signal of danger, and the inference was that he
saw the decedent but expected her to get off the tracks. Her administrator sued
for wrongful death. Held, that recovery should be allowed because the defend-
ant had the last clear chance to avoid the injury. Gunter's Adn'r v. Southern
Ry. (i92o, Va.) IO S. E. 885.
The opinion would seem to be somewhat confused in its application of the
doctrine of last clear chance. See COMMENT (915) 24 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 330;
(1920) 29 ibid., 542. However the decision can be explained by the fact that
the defendant was under a duty to give some warning to those privileged to
walk on its tracks, and that, therefore, the decedent was not negligent in relying
upon performance of this duty.
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TORTS-VEXATION-TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE.-The defendant telephone
company disconnected the plaintiff's telephone, believing, as a result of a mistake
in their accounting department, that the plaintiff had not paid his bill. The
plaintiff brought suit for vexation, annoyance, and inconvenience. Held, that
he should recover. Southwestern Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. Riggs (i919,
Tex. Civ. App.) 216 S. W. 403.
This case is directly opposed to the general rule that damages will not be
given for mere inconvenience and annoyance where there is no actual physical
or mental -injury. Mental injury for which recovery can be had must be more
than mere vexation or loss of temper. See Sedgwick, Damages (9th ed. 1912)
sec. 42, 46a; see also (1919) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 508, 707, 713.
UNFAIR COMPETITION-SIMILARITY OF APPEARANCE-PAINTING TAxi.-The
plaintiff had built up a prosperous taxicab business and was known by the color
of his cabs. The defendant's cabs differed in minor points, but the bodies were
of the same general shape, and had recently been painted the same color for
the purpose of securing patronage. The plaintiff sued to enjoin the operation
of such cabs by the defendant while so painted. Held, that an injunction should
issue. Taxi & Yellow Taxi Operating Co. v..Martit (1919, N. J. Ch.) io8
Atl. 763.
This case seems sound and in accord with the tendency of the modern decis-
ions. See (igig) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 288.
WILLs-CoNDITIONS-REMOVAL.--The testatrix provided that if her son "shall
marry" a certain widow, his income by the will in question should be cut in
half. The son married the widow subsequent to the execution of the will,
but prior to the death of the testatrix, who had had immediate knowledge of
the marriage. The decree of distribution allowed the son the full income.
Held, that such decree was correct, because the marriage before the death
of the testatrix removed the very contingency upon which the inhibition was to
become effective. In re Duffill's Estate (1919, Calif.) 183 Pac. 337.
The court reasoned that since a will "speaks as at the death of the testator,"
and since there was nothing in the will by which the son's income was to be
diminished in event of the marriage before the death of the testatrix, the will
contemplated the possibility of marriage after the death. Such strict construc-
tion, while in accord with some respected authority, seems to defeat the intent
of the testatrix. Although she knew of the marriage and did not revoke the
will, she well might have thought the situation amply provided for.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AcT-INJuRY ARISING "OUT OF THE" EMPLOYMENT
-VOLUNTARY AcT OF A CoiMnoyF.-The decedent had been employed as a
watchman and was in the performance of his duties. The fifteen year old
office boy, finding a pistol on the desk in the next room, began to examine it
to satisfy his curiosity. While he was so doing, the pistol was discharged
and struck and killed the decedent. His dependants sought compensation.
Held, that the injury arose "out of the" employment. Marchiatello v. The Lynch
Realty Co. (1gig, Conn.) io8 AtI. 799.
For discussion, see COmxENTS, supra, p. 669.
